A Hostile Environment: How the  Severe or Pervasive Requirement and the Employer\u27s Affirmative Defense Trap Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs in a Catch-22 by White, Evan D. H.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 6
7-1-2006
A Hostile Environment: How the "Severe or
Pervasive"Requirement and the Employer's
Affirmative Defense Trap Sexual Harassment
Plaintiffs in a Catch-22
Evan D. H. White
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evan D. White, A Hostile Environment: How the "Severe or Pervasive"Requirement and the Employer's Affirmative Defense Trap Sexual
Harassment Plaintiffs in a Catch-22, 47 B.C.L. Rev. 853 (2006), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol47/iss4/6
A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: HOW THE
"SEVERE OR PERVASIVE" REQUIREMENT
AND THE EMPLOYER'S AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE TRAP SEXUAL HARASSMENT
PLAINTIFFS IN A CATCH-22
Abstract: This Note argues that the combination of the "severe or perva-
sive" requirement and the employer's affirmative defense, as applied in
lower federal courts, makes it very difficult for a hostile work environment
sexual harassment plaintiff to prevail against his or her employer. Courts
require actionable harassment to consist of one extremely severe incident
or to continue long enough to become cumulatively severe or pervasive.
But once the harassment has gone on long enough to become severe or
pervasive, the employer's affirmative defense is increasingly likely to bar
the plaintiff's prima facie case. The result is that as the plaintiff's prima fa-
cie case grows stronger, the probability that the employer will prevail on its
affirmative defense also increases. This Note argues that such a contradic-
tory approach is unfair to plaintiffs and proposes a more equitable stan-
dard that would place plaintiff's and employers on equal footing.
INTRODUCTION
Hostile work environment sexual harassment cases have troubled
lower federal courts since the cause of action was first recognized by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986. 1 Two of the major issues have been
(1) articulating the criteria for evaluating prima facie sexual harass-
ment claims and identifying the appropriate threshold for an action-
able environment, and (2) determining when to impute liability to an
employer for the conduct of its supervisory employees. 2
 Courts have
struggled with these issues and with achieving the goal of equal op-
portunities in the workplace for men and women—a goal that under-
lies Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3
I See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66-67 (1986); infra notes 55-212 and
accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 55-79 and accompanying text.
3
 See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000); Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17,22 (1993); infra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
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As the Supreme Court stated in its first hostile work environment
sexual harassment case, conduct must. be "severe or pervasive" to be
actionable.4 The Court later clarified that the harassing conduct had
to "create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an en-
vironment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." 5
This broad language and the lack of a clear definition of "severe or
pervasive" led lower federal courts to require varying degrees of abu-
siveness and persistence to find a hostile work environment. 6
The Supreme Court hoped to effectuate Title VII's primary objec-
tive of preventing workplace discrimination by granting employers an
affirmative defense to liability for the conduct of supervisory employ-
ees.7 The affirmative defense was designed to encourage employers to
implement effective complaint mechanisms and grievance procedures. 8
It requires an employer to prove that (1) the employer exercised rea-
sonable care to prevent and correct workplace harassment, and (2) the
victim unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive and cor-
rective mechanisms established by the employer"
Lower federal courts have interpreted these requirements loosely."'
For the first prong, many courts require employers to show little more
than promulgation of an anti-harassment policy that addresses sexual
harassment and a grievance procedure that allows an employee to by-
pass a harassing supervisor," Some courts find that an employer has sa-
tisfied this requirement even when the employer's response to the com-
plaint fails to stop the harassment.' 2 Because many courts find that the
existence of such a policy and procedure satisfies the duty of reasonable
Mentor, 477 U.S. at 67.
5 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
6 See infra notes 80-158 and accompanying text.
7 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-4)6 (1998).
8 See id.
9 Id. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
10 See infra notes 160-212 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g„ Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08 (finding against employer only because it failed
to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among employees, even though the
policy did not include any assurance that a 'complainant could bypass the harassing super-
visor, and also stating that demonstration that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use any
adequate complaint procedure provided by the employer will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer's burden); Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir.
2000) (noting that, once an employer has promulgated an effective anti-harassment policy,
it is incumbent upon the employees to utilize the procedural mechanisms established by
the company).
12 See Crenshaw v. Delray, Farms, Inc., 968 F. Stipp. 1300, 1306-07 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(finding no evidence that employer should have been aware after the first of three inci-
dents that a warning and reprimand would not sufficiently deter harasser).
20061	 A Catch-22 in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Cases
	 855
care to prevent and correct harassment under the first prong, an em-
ployee's failure to use that policy and procedure is usually found to be
unreasonable under the second prong.' 3
 This is true even if the em-
ployee merely delays a few weeks in reporting the harassment."
These cases place an early burden on victims of sexual harass-
ment to determine whether the conduct in question is serious enough
to justify or require a complaint to their employer.° An employee who
is subjected to an isolated incident of trivial or low-level harassment
may prefer to resolve the situation herself or simply look past it,
rather than endure the complications and acrimony that often ac-
company the filing of a formal complaint.° Such an employee does so
at her own risk, however." If she does not report the incident, or
merely delays in reporting it, and is later subjected to further harass-
ment, many courts may bar her from asserting a cause of action be-
cause they will find that her failure to complain promptly following
the first incident was unreasonable."' In many cases, however, the
same courts will also find that the initial incident was insufficiently
severe to be actionable, thereby precluding her from establishing a
cause of action even if she does report the incident.° Therefore,
15 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08 (stating that demonstration that plaintiff unrea-
sonably failed to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer's burden); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (same); Madray, 208 F.3d
at 1300.
14 See Thompson v. Naphcare, Inc., 117 F. App'x 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding delay
of almost two months unreasonable); Conatier v. Med. Prorl Bldg. Servs. Corp., 95 F.
App'x 276, 281 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding delay of two and a half weeks unreasonable);
Hanes v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., No. Civ.A.04-0365-BI-C, 2005 WL 1840236, at *12
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 2, 2005) (finding delay of two months unreasonable); Olsen v. H.E.B. Pan-
try Foods, 196 F. Supp. 2d 436, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (finding delay of two months unrea-
sonable).
15 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Mad ray, 208 F.3d at 1300.
16 See, e.g., Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2001)
(noting that plaintiff claimed she reasonably feared retaliation by co-workers if she re-
ported the harassment); Hanna v. Boys & Girls Home & Family Servs., Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d
1049, 1069 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (finding a factual issue whether plaintiff was terminated in
retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment); McGraw v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No.
CIV. A. 96-5780, 1997 WL 799437, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997) (same); Pereira v. Schlage
Elecs., 902 F. Supp. 1095, 1099, 1100-01 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that after plaintiff's
complaint about harassment, co-workers threatened to kill her, burn down her house, and
kidnap her and leave her where she would be raped and killed).
17
 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300.
16
 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300.
19 See, e.g., Faraglier, 524 U.S. at 788 (staling that isolated incident.% unless extremely
severe, will not create an actionable environment); Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374
(2d Cir. 2002) (stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate either that a single incident was
extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents was sufficiently continuous and con-
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these courts require a plaintiff to report incidents of harassment that
are likely not actionable and also find that such a plaintiff will have no
cause of action even if she reports the harassment the moment it be-
comes actionable. 2°
This Note analyzes the relationship between the "severe or perva-
sive" standard in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases
and the employer's affirmative defense. 2 ' Part I of this Note demon-
strates how the combination of the "severe or pervasive" requirement
and the employer's affirmative defense makes it difficult for victims to
successfully assert a cause of action. 22 Section A of Part I reviews the
Supreme Court's decisions articulating the hostile work environment
sexual harassment cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that established the "severe or pervasive" standard for an
actionable environment and the affirmative defense to employer li-
ability.23 Section B of Part I then examines lower federal courts' inter-
pretation and application of these precedents. 24 This Section reviews
cases finding that: ( 1) the plaintiff failed to allege severe or pervasive
harassment sufficiently; (2) the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive; (3) the plaintiff's failure to report the harassment promptly
was unreasonable, in contravention of the affirmative defense's man-
date; and (4) although the plaintiff reported the harassment to the
employer and no action was taken in response, the employer never-
theless can prevail on a motion for summary judgment. 25
Part II analyzes the tendency of many lower federal courts to
hold plaintiffs to a strict standard while granting leniency to employ-
ers. 26 This Part also addresses how courts place an unfair burden on
sexual harassment victims to make an early prediction of whether ad-
certed); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258,264 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating dial
actionable cases have involved patterns or allegations of extensive, long-lasting, mire-
dressed, and uninhibited sexual threats or conduct that permeated the plaintiffs' work
environment); McGraw, 1997 \VI, 799437, at *5 (stating that courts have required plaintiffs
to show they have been subjected to continued explicit propositions, sexual epithets, or
persistent offensive touchings).
20 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (stating that an employer will be subject to vicarious li-
ability for an "actionable" hostile environment); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Stipp. 2d
1029,1033-34 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (granting summary judgment to employer where victim
did not report an isolated incident that occurred three months prior to the majority of the
harassment, but did promptly report the subsequent incidents).
21 See infra notes 29-353 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 29-54 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 55-79 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 213-325 and accompanying text.
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ditional harassment will occur in order to preserve a cause of action. 27
Part H concludes by proposing a standard that would balance the ob-
ligations of employees and employers in sexual harassment hostile
work environment cases.28
I. How THE "SEVERE OR PERVASIVE" REQUIREMENT AND THE
EMPLOYER'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TRAP
PLAINTIFFS IN A CATCH-22
The dilemma that plaintiffs face is most apparent in cases in
which an employee initially experiences low-level or isolated harass-
ment that subsequently develops into more severe harassment. 29 Such
a victim's predicament can be demonstrated by the following hypo-
thetical, In an initial act of harassment, a female employee's supervi-
sor makes a lewd comment or touches her inappropriately." No fur-
ther incidents occur for a few weeks or even months. 31 Then, after an
extended incident-free period, her supervisor resumes the inappro-
priate conduct. This time, the harassing behavior is more severe or
frequent. The victim may decide that this conduct is too offensive to
tolerate and report the harassment to her employer. As will be dem-
onstrated, however, at this point she may already have forfeited any
21 See iatfra notes 213-325 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 326-353 and accompanying text,
29 See infra notes 30-54 and accompanying text.
39 Isolated or trivial incidents will almost categorically fail to constitute an actionable
hostile work environment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)
(stating that isolated incidents, unless extremely severe, will not create an actionable envi-
ronment); Marto v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that a plaintiff mist
demonstrate either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe or that a series of inci-
dents was sufficiently continuous and concerted); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164
F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that actionable cases have involved patterns or allega-
tions of extensive, long-lasting, unredressed, and uninhibited sexual threats or conduct
that permeated the plaintiffs' work environment); McGraw v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No.
CIV, A. 96-5780, 1997 WL 799437, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997) (stating that courts have
required plaintiffs to show they have been subjected to continued explicit propositions,
sexual epithets, or persistent offensive touchings).
51
 Many courts will evaluate the initial incident in conjunction with any future inci-
dents even if they are separated by a significant time interval. See, e.g., Conatzer v. Med.
Prof] Bldg. Servs. Corp., 95 F. App'x 276, 278 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding unreasonable de-
lay in reporting harassment where victim did not report an incident where supervisor
leaned up against her and rubbed against her side, but did report the incident seventeen
days later promptly following a second, more serious incident); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp.,
83 F. Stipp. 2d 1029, 1033-34 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (finding delay unreasonable where there
were three months between the initial and subsequent incidents, even though all harass-
ment was promptly reported following the subsequent incidents).
858	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 47:853
potential legal action because she failed to report the initial incident
promptly."
Following the initial incident, the victim must decide how to re-
spond. She must determine whether the conduct was severe or perva-
sive, as well as predict whether additional harassment will occur." This
preliminary response to the single incident is crucial to the victim's
future legal standing.34 Thus, the victim's options are to report the
conduct to her employer after the incident, attempt to resolve the
situation on her own, or simply look past the incident, as courts may,
as an isolated incident, in an effort to avoid the controversy likely to
arise if she does report it. 35
There arc five common scenarios that follow from this situation:
1. Even if the victim reports the incident to her employer, at this
point, the employer has no apparent legal obligation to take
action in response." An employer will only be subject to vi-
carious liability for an actionable hostile work environment. 37
To be actionable, the harassment must be severe or perva-
sive."
2. If the harassment stops after this incident, the employer will
not be liable regardless of its response." Assuming the initial
32 See infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
33 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (stating that an employer will be subject to vicarious li-
ability for an "actionable" hostile environment); Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1033-34 (grant-
ing summary judgment to employer where victim did not report an isolated incident that
occurred three months prior to the majority of the harassment, but did promptly report
the subsequent incidents).
34 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278, 281 (finding delay unreasonable where victim did
not report an incident where supervisor leaned up against her and rubbed against her
side, but did report the incident seventeen (lays later promptly following a second incident
where he placed her in a headlock with his thighs); Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34.
35 See Fa ragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; Indest, 164 F.3d at 264; McGraw,
1997 WL 799437, at *5.
36 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Saidu-Kaniara V. Parkway Corp., 155 F. Supp. 2d 436,
438, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (granting summary judgment to employer where plaintiff's su-
pervisor, among other things, touched her breasts and buttocks, and employer took no
action even though plaintiff repeatedly reported these incidents).
37 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Stipp. 2d at 438, 440.
33 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 438, 440.
" See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 921, 926 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding work environment non-actionable where co-worker touched plaintiff's
stomach and then breast under her sweater); Simmons v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 391
F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1133 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (finding work environment non-actionable where
supervisor touched plaintiff's breast four to five times, put his hands on her hips once, and
brushed her leg once); Schaber-Goa v. Dept of Rehab. & Corr., No. 3:03CV7524, 2005 WL
1223891, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2005) (finding work environment non-actionable
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incident was insufficiently severe to be actionable, the em-
ployer is insulated from vicarious liability because the envi-
ronment was never actionable. 4°
3. If the harassment continues, but never becomes severe or
pervasive, the employer will not be liable regardless of its re-
sponse. 41 As in the second scenario, the employer cannot be
liable because the victim cannot make out a prima facie
case.42
4. If the harassment continues and eventually becomes severe
or pervasive, the employer will not be liable if the victim
failed to report the conduct promptly following the first in-
cident.° This is true even if she reported the conduct once it
became severe or pervasive." The employer will succeed on
the affirmative defense because the victim failed to report
the harassment promptly—that is, promptly following the
first incident, no matter how trivial or long ago.°
5. If the harassment continues and eventually becomes severe
or pervasive, the employer may be liable if the victim re-
ported the conduct within a reasonable time of the first inci-
dent and within a reasonable time following subsequent in-
cidents.46 The employer, however, will only be liable if it
where plaintiff's co-worker touched her crotch and grabbed her breast because the two
incidents were "situationally isolated" and, therefore, not "sufficiently pervasive"); Saidu-
Kamara, 155 F. Supp. 2r1 at 438, 440 (finding work environment non-actionable where
plaintiff's supervisor touched her breasts and buttocks).
40 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 438, 440.
41 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Brooks, 229 F.3d at 921, 926; Simmons, 391 F. Stipp. 2d at
1133; Schaber-Goa, 2005 WL 1223891, at *5; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Stipp. 2d at 438, 440.
42 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Stipp. 2d at 438, 440.
43 SeeThompson v. Naphcare, Inc., 117 F. App'x 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding delay
of almost two months unreasonable); Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281 (finding delay of two and
a half weeks unreasonable); Hanes v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Cu.., No. Civ.A.04-0365-1114-C,
2005 WL 1840236, at *12 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 2, 2005) (finding delay of two months unreason-
able); Olsen v. M.E.B. Pantry Foods, 196 F. Supp. 2d 436, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (finding
delay of two months unreasonable).
44
 See Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34.
45 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278 (finding delay unreasonable where victim did not re-
port an incident where supervisor leaned up against her and rubbed against her side);
Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34 (finding delay unreasonable where victim did not report
incident that occurred three months prior to the majority of the harassment).
46 See Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming par-
tial summary judgment to employer where plaintiff complained promptly of supervisor's
conduct to a superior, but when the superior then began to harass plaintiff, she Palled to
complain promptly); Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34 (granting summary judgment to
employer where victim did not report an isolated incident that occurred three months
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failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct the harassment after it was reported. 47
In order to establish a prima facie case, the harassment must ei-
ther consist of an extremely severe incident or continue long enough
to become severe or pervasive." Once the conduct becomes severe or
pervasive, the employer's affirmative defense still may serve to bar the
plaintiff's prima facie case." One isolated incident is not likely to be
actionable, so a plaintiff could not assert a claim of severe or pervasive
harassment. 5° If, however, further incidents occur, sufficient to make
the harassment actionable, then the plaintiff still may not prevail on
her claim because the employer may succeed on its affirmative de-
fense. 51 Such an employee finds herself in a difficult situation. 52 If she
complains, she will only have a cause of action if the conduct is severe
or pervasive.53 But if she does not complain, she will have no cause of
action if the conduct eventually becomes severe or pervasive. 54
A. Supreme Court Decisions: Creation of the Hostile Work Environment Cause
of Action and the Employer's Affirmative Defense
In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the U.S. Supreme Court
first recognized hostile work environment sexual harassment as a type
prior to the majority of the harassment, but did report promptly following the subsequent
inciden ts).
47 See Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cie 2000) (affirming
finding that employer could not satisfy affirmative defense where evidence showed less
than reasonable efforts to remedy the harassment and the investigation was inadequate, if
not a "complete sham"); White v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 221 F.3d 254, 261-62 (Ist Cir. 2000)
(affirming finding that employer could not satisfy affirmative defense where it did not
handle the investigation properly or finicky, and allowed the conduct to continue); Cren-
shaw v. Delray Farms, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1300, 1306-07 (N.D. 111. 1997) (finding no evi-
dence that employer should have been aware after the first of three incidents that a warn-
ing and reprimand would not sufficiently deter harasser, when it took three separate
warnings to end the harassment).
" See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; Indent, 164 F.3d at 264.
45 See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2001) (re-
jecting plaintiff's argument that she needed time to collect evidence against her supervisor
so company officials would believe her, and rejecting argument that it was proper to re-
frain from reporting her supervisor so she could determine whether he was a "predator"
or merely an "interested man" who could be politely rebuffed); Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at
1033-34.
50 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Allan°, 294 F.3d at 374; Indent, 164 F.3d at 264.
51 See Matvia, 259 F.3d at 269-70; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34.
52 See Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34.
53 See Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2(1 at 1033-34.
54 See Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1033-34.
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of discrimination based on sex.55 The Court found that the phrase
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 "evinces a congressional intent to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in em-
ployment."56 To be actionable, the Court held, the harassment must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the vic-
tim's employment and create an abusive working environment."
The Court next addressed a hostile work environment claim in
1993, in Harris v. Fork Systems, Inc." The Court stated that an em-
ployer violates Title VII when the workplace permeates with discrimi-
natory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and cre-
ate an abusive working environment. 59 The Court held that the har-
assment must create an objectively hostile or abusive work environ-
mcnt—one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,
although the victim need not suffer physical or psychological harm.°
The Court instructed lower courts to look at the totality of the cir-
cumstances in determining whether a hostile work environment ex-
ists. 61 The Court provided a list of factors to consider, including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work per-
formance.62 The Court further indicated that no single factor is re-
quired to create a hostile work environment. 65
Following Mentor and Harris, there was a general consensus
among lower federal courts that with regard to harassment by co-
workers, an employer would be vicariously liable if the employer knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt
and effective remedial action.64 The standard for employer liability
with respect to the conduct of supervisory employees, however, was
55 See 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
56 Id. at 64 (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v, Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
(1978)).
57 Id. at 67.
56 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc„ 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
" Id. at 21.
60 Id. at 21-22.
BI Id. at 23.
52 Id.
65 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
fid See, e.g., Burlington hll's., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998); Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986).
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less clear.° Employers were not automatically liable for the conduct of
supervisory employees. 66 However, the mere existence of a grievance
procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with the
plaintiff's failure to invoke that procedure, did not alone insulate an
employer.°
In 1998, in the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of employer liability for the conduct of supervisory
employees.° For any harassment not resulting in a tangible employ-
ment action—such as firing, demotion, or unfavorable reassign-
ment—the plaintiff must prove that the conduct was sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to create an actionable environment.° And when
the victim suffers no tangible employment action an employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability for sexual harassment by su-
pervisory employees."
To assert the affirmative defense, an employer must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the employer exercised rea-
sonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing
behavior, and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. 71
The Court stated that, although the existence of an anti-harassment
policy with a complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as
a matter of law, the need for such mechanisms may appropriately be
considered when analyzing the steps taken by the employer to prevent
and correct sexual harassment. 72 And although proof that an employee
failed to exert reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing
an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by
the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to
satisfy the employer's burden under the second prong." The Court in
Faragher found that the employer failed to exercise reasonable care be-
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785.
06 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
67 Id.
" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775-811; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742-74.
69 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786; see Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (defining a tangible employment
action as "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to pro-
mote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits"). ,
" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
71
 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
12 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
73 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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cause it had failed to disseminate its policy to employees and the policy
did not ensure that the harassing supervisor could be bypassed when
employees registered complaints."
The Faragher Court also discussed what types of conduct create a
hostile work environment." The Court stated that the standards for
judging hostility ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility
code for the workplace and that, properly applied, these standards will
filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the work-
place, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related
jokes, and occasional teasing." Therefore, simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents—unless extremely serious—will not
create an actionable environment 7 7 In a later case, the Court added
that hostile work environment claims are not based on discrete acts, but
rather, on incidents that occur over a series of days or perhaps years."
Such claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts."
B. Lower Federal Court Decisions: Defining the Actionable "Severe or
Pervasive" Threshold and When the Affirmative Defense Is Satisfied
I. Cases Finding Conduct Insufficiently Severe or Pervasive to
Constitute a Hostile Work Environment
Despite the seemingly reasonable threshold alluded to by the Su-
preme Court in Harris—severe or pervasive harassment by a reasonable
person's standards—many lower federal courts began requiring an ar-
guably higher threshold than what a reasonable person would find hos-
tile or abusive 80 In 1997, in Crenshaw v. Delray Farms, Inc., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois held the harassing
conduct at issue to be insufficiently severe or pervasive to be action-
able.81 In this case, a co-worker grabbed the plaintiff's breast. 82 A week
later, he told her he "needed somebody small like her to pick up in the
air and have sex with."83 Shortly thereafter, he grabbed and squeezed
74 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.




 See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,115 (2002).
79 Irl.
B° See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; infra notes 81-117 and accompanying text.
BI See 968 F. Supp. at 1306.
82
 Id. at 1302.
85 Id.
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her buttocks for several seconds and called her an "ignorant ass
bitch."84 Two months later, another co-worker came up behind her,
rubbed his penis on her back and said "Oh, mamasita."85 Two months
after this incident, another co-worker asked the plaintiff if she cheated
on her husband and told her that he would pay her to "be with him." 86
A few days later, the same co-worker grabbed her and attempted to kiss
her.87
 The next week, the plaintiff was in the women's bathroom with
the door locked when the same co-worker popped the lock open and
entered.88 He attempted to grab the plaintiff, but she escaped. 89 Two
months after these incidents, another co-worker told the plaintiff that
her pants "made his groins growl" and that he wanted to take her to a
hote1.90 He told the plaintiff that he wanted to "eat [her] out" and "do
all types of tricks with [her]."" Finally, a month later, the plaintiff was
surrounded by two supervisors and two managers all of whom yelled at
her and threatened her job. 92
The court stated that the plaintiff must establish not only that she
was adversely affected by the conduct, but also that a reasonable person
would have been adversely affected.93 The court concluded that iso-
lated instances of inappropriate conduct do not constitute sexual har-
assment and found that the offensive conduct at issue did not consti-
tute a hostile work environment because it was not persistent." The
court also found that the employer appropriately dealt with the per-
petrators, even though the plaintiff was harassed by at least six differ-
ent co-workers and supervisors on several occasions. 95 In one instance,
it took two warnings for a co-worker to stop harassing her, and in an-
other case, it took three warnings to end the harassment. 96
In 1996, in Hannigan-Haas v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that a serious
physical assault was insufficient as a matter of law to create a hostile
s Id.
85 Id.
86 Crenshaw, 968 F. Supp. at 1302.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1303.
89 Id.
8° Id.
gi Crenshaw, 968 F. Supp. at 1303.
92 Id.
95 Id. at 1305-06.
84 Id. at 1306.
95 Id. at 1301-03.
96 Crenshaw, 968 F. Supp. at 1306.
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work environment because it was only one incident. 97
 One of the
plaintiff's supervisors, a senior vice president of the company, ap-
proached her and asked her to accompany him into an office. 98 Once
there, he closed the door and, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, locked
it.99 When she attempted to leave the room, he stood up, pushed her
against a wall, leaned his chest against hers, and said "open your
mouth" as he attempted to kiss her with an open mouth.' 9" She
turned her head to avoid the kiss. 101 He then tried to touch her
breasts and to place his hands under her pantyhose.'" The plaintiff
was able to break free and ran from the room. 198
 Despite the serious
nature of the assault, the court found that it was insufficiently severe
or pervasive to be actionable because it was only a single incident.'"
In 1999, in Blough v, Hawkins Market, Inc., another case involving
serious physical contact, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio found the challenged conduct insufficiently severe or
pervasive to establish a hostile work environment. 198
 The plaintiff's co-
worker patted her on the buttocks and, several months later, grabbed
her crotch. 106 Another co-worker attempted to kiss her and apparently
engaged in self-stimulation while she was looking. 197 The court con-
cluded that a hostile environment'requires more than a few isolated
incidents of offensive conduct. 198
In 1995, in Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., the U.S, District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio found the following harass-
ment to be insufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable.' 99
 Two
seventeen-year-old female employees were harassed by a forty-year-old
male co-worker.u° During a six-clay period, the first plaintiff endured
the co-worker blowing kisses at her, licking his lips, and smiling at her
seductively or perversely on several occasions; making obscene ges-
tures toward his crotch on one occasion; touching her chest above her
97 See No. 95 C 7408, 1996 WL 650419, at *5 (N.D. M. Nov. 6, 1996).




102 Hannigan-Haas, 1996 WL 650419, at *1.
195 Id.
I'm Id. at *5.
105 See 51 F. Stipp. 2d 858, 864 (N.D. Ohio 1999).




 See913 F. Stipp. 1045, 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
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breast with his finger on one occasion; and making vulgar sexual re-
marks in her presence about another female co-worker on one occa-
sion."' The second plaintiff endured similar harassment. 112 The co-
worker once suggested that he was "falling in love" with her, tickled
her on another occasion, and kissed her on the cheek or hugged her
on four occasions. 333 On yet another occasion, he approached her
from behind and lifted her breasts."4 He also repeatedly asked her to
go on a date. 1 i 5
The court reasoned that although the facts suggested that these
particular plaintiffs subjectively perceived this conduct to affect the
conditions of their employment, the likely reaction of a "hypothetical
reasonable person" was less clear."8 The court went on to conclude
that neither of the plaintiffs' contentions definitively met the "severe
or pervasive" standard, and thus neither was actionable." 7
2. Cases Finding That Conduct Was Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive to
Create a Hostile Work Environment
Two cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
illustrate the magnitude of harassment required by some courts to
establish that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be ac-
tionable." 8 In 2004, in McPherson v. City of Waukegan, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the two most severe incidents of the following conduct
were sufficient to create a hostile work environment." 9 The plaintiff
stated that her supervisor asked her what color bra she was wearing a
"handful" of times.'" Once, when the plaintiff called in sick, her su-
pervisor responded by suggestively asking if he could "make a house
call."12 ' He asked the same question two or three more times during
the course of her employment. 122 On another occasion, at a time
when they were unobserved by others, he asked her what color bra
she was wearing and then pulled back her tank top to see for him-
111 Id. at 1053.
112 Id. at 1053-54.
115 Id. at 1054.
114 Blankenship, 913 F. Stipp. at 1054.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1055.
112 Id.
118 See infra notes 119-158 and accompanying text.
110 See 379 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2004).
120 Id. at 434.
121 Id. at 435.
122 Id.
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self.'" About a month later, he called the plaintiff into his office. 124 As
they were discussing a work document, he slid his hand under her
shirt and felt her breasts. 125
 Five days later, he called her into his office
again and asked her to shut the door.I 26
 When she turned to leave, he
approached her and slid his hand under her shirt, touching her
breasts.' 27
 The plaintiff asked him to stop, but he pushed her toward
the wall behind his office door.'" He then put his hand clown her
pants and inserted his finger into her vagina.'"
The court found that all of the conduct prior to the two physical
assaults was merely boorish behavior that was not severe or pervasive. ] "a
The court concluded that the earlier behavior was "lamentably inap-
propriate," but insufficient due to its limited nature and infrequency. 131
The court did find, however, that the two instances of physical assault
were sufficient to constitute a hostile work environment. 132
Similarly, in 1999, in Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., the Seventh Circuit
held the following harassment to create an actionable work environ-
ment.'" The plaintiff worked on the assembly line at an automobile
plant. 134
 Over the course of approximately eight years, she endured re-
peated acts of harassment involving improper touching, verbal abuse,
and the display of offensive objects, cartoons, and pictures.'" Several of
the plaintiff's complaints involved the use or display of fake rubber pe-
nises.'" At least twice a week, for the duration of her employment,
these fake penises were sent down the assembly line past her work sta-
tion. 137
 On one occasion, a co-worker brandished a fake penis between
his legs and yelled at the plaintiff, "Look what I got for you; bet you
can't handle this."138
 Three other times, fake penises were left on a car
in her work area, 139
 She also related two instances of offensive touch-
123 Id.
124






 McPherson, 379 F.3t1 at 435.
1" Id. at 439.
131
152 Id.
1 " See 172 F.3c1 500, 511 (7th Cir. 1999).





 Wi/SON., 172 F.3d at 507.
199 Id.
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ing."° A co-worker would regularly stand close to her, look at her
breasts, and say "umm." 141 He would deliberately position his hand so
that it would come into contact with her breasts when she bent down. 142
Another co-worker flicked his finger on her breast. 143 She also cited
several humiliating exchanges involving verbal abuse. 144 One co-worker
addressed her by saying "Hi, ho," meaning "whore." 143 Another accused
her of "sucking a white boy's dick on the roof."'" Another commented,
"I can make your pussy bloom."147 Yet another co-worker told her that
white men only spoke to her because they "wanted her to-tu." 1 "
More frequently, the plaintiff was taunted with offensive litera-
ture."9 A co-worker handed her a paper that pontificated on why beer
is better than women. 30 Another co-worker showed her a picture of a
nude woman and stated, "Too bad you don't have a body like this." 131
On another occasion, a photograph of a nude man was taped to the
hood of a car on which she was working.' 32 She also found an offen-
sive cartoon taped to her work station. 153 Sexually explicit cartoons
were handed to her or displayed in her work area. 154 Finally, while on
medical leave, she received a lewd greeting card that had been signed
by approximately thirty-eight employees at the plant including a su-
pervisor and three foremen. 133
The court noted the multifaceted nature of the harassment, its
frequent and at times routine character, and the participation of so
many members of the workforce. 136 Considering the cumulative effect
of the harassment, the court noted that the plaintiff depicted a work-
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149 Id.
150 Id.
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norm. 157
 The court concluded that the plaintiff had stated an action-
able claim for an objectively hostile work environment.' 58
3. Cases Finding the Plaintiff's Failure to Report Unreasonable
In addition to holding plaintiffs to a high threshold for satisfying
the "severe or pervasive" standard, many courts also dismiss plaintiffs'
cases for failure to report trivial or isolated incidents through the em-
ployer's affirmative delense. 159 In 2000, in Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment in a case in which the
plaintiff was initially subjected to one isolated incident of offensive
conduct by her supervisor. 150
 No other incidents of harassment oc-
curred until three months later, when she was subjected to four inci-
dents in a seven-day period.' 0 ' The initial incident involved the super-
visor squeezing the plaintiff's breasts. 162
 Three months later, he
grabbed the front of her pants; the next clay, he grabbed her hand
and placed it on the front of his pants; four days later, he rubbed his
hands across her buttocks; and the next day, he rubbed his hands
across and down her back.'" TWo days after this final incident, the
plaintiff reported the offensive conduct fo her employer.'"
The court found that, by not reporting the offensive conduct un-
til two days after the final incident, the plaintiff had unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by her employer. 165
 The court considered all five incidents
together and found that the plaintiff had waited over three months to
report the harassment.' 55
 The court concluded that, although the five
incidents were sufficiently severe or pervasive, the employer had suc-
cessfully proven its affirmative defense to liability and was entitled to
summary judgment. 167
Similarly, in 2004, in Conatzer v. Medical Professional Building Serv-
ices Corp., the Tenth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment
157 Id.
158 Wilson, 172 F.3d at 511.
159
 See infra notes 160-191 and accompanying text.




164 Id. at 1033.
165 Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1039.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1033-34.
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for the employer in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that her su-
pervisor had sexually harassed her on two occasions. 168 The first inci-
dent involved physical contact between the plaintiff and her supervi-
sor, described by the shift supervisor as the plaintiffs supervisor
stepping up to the plaintiff, leaning against her, and rubbing against
the side of her chest. 169 Two weeks later, as the plaintiff bent over to
pick something up, her supervisor briefly placed her in a headlock
with his thighs.'" The plaintiff registered a complaint four or five days
after the second incident, or seventeen days after the first incident.' 71
The court concluded that, absent an adequate explanation for
this delay, the plaintiff had acted unreasonably.'" Furthermore, the
court rejected the argument that because the shift supervisor wit-
nessed the first incident, the employer was obligated to respond prior
to the plaintiff's formal complaint.'" The court also stated that there
was no indication that the shift supervisor observed anything other
than an isolated incident.'"
Similarly, in 2001, in Matvia v. Bald I-lead Island Management, Inc.,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed an employer's motion for summary
judgment.'" Beginning in September 1997, the plaintiff's supervisor
approached her, said he needed a hug, and proceeded to hug her.'"
He told the plaintiff, after she had just dyed her hair brown, that he
would now have to fantasize about a brunette rather than a blond.'"
He informed her that he no longer had sexual relations with his
wife.'" He placed a pornographic picture on her desk.'" He told her
she looked good enough to eat. 18° He frequently placed his arm
around her and massaged her shoulder. 181 He also repeatedly told her
that he loved her and had a crush on her. 182 In December 1997, he
told her that he dreamt that she sued him for sexual harassment and
" 95 F. App'x at 278, 281.
169 Id. at 278.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 281.
779 Conalzer, 95 F. App'x at 281.
174 Id.
176 259 F.3d at 270.
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warned her that if she did bring suit, she would be in big trouble. 183
Five clays after recounting his dream, he pulled her close to him, tried
to kiss her, and struggled with her until she was able to escape. 184 The
plaintiffs employer learned of the harassment the following day. 183
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that she needed time
to collect evidence against her supervisor so that company officials
would believe her. 186 The court also rejected her argument that it was
proper for her to refrain from reporting her supervisor so she could
determine whether he was a "predator" or merely an "interested man"
who could be politely rebuffec1. 187 The court stated that case law
makes no distinction between "predators" and "interested men," and
the label given to the harasser is immateria1. 188 The court concluded
that the gravity and frequency of the incidents made it clear that the
supervisor was not merely an interested man who could be politely
rebuffed. 189 Although the plaintiff explained that she did not report
the earlier conduct because she was not sure if she was being sexually
harassed and whether the company would believe her, the court
affirmed the employer's motion for summary judgment. 18° The court,
with the benefit of hindsight, concluded that the plaintiff should have
found the earlier conduct sexually harassing and reported 4. 181
4. Cases Dismissing Plaintiffs Claim Despite Complaint Made to
Employer and Employer's Refusal to Take Action in Response
In addition to granting employers' motions for summary judg-
ment when the plaintiff failed to report or delayed in reporting har-
assment, some courts granted these motions even when the plaintiff
did complain and the employer ignored it. 182 In 2002, in Wyatt v. Hunt
Plywood Co., the Fifth Circuit affirmed the employer's motion for
summary judgment for the majority of the following hara_ssment. 183 In
this case, the plaintiff was sexually harassed both by her immediate
185 Id.
184
185 Matvia, 259 F.3d at 270. The opinion does not state how the employer came to
learn of the harassment. See id. at 261-73.
188 Irl, at 269.
187 Id,
188 Id.
189 Id. at 270.
' 9° Matvia, 259 F.3d at 269-70.
191 See id.
192 See infra notes 193-212 and accompanying text.
195 See 297 F.3d 405,414 (5th Cir. 2002).
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supervisor and the supervisor to whom she complained.'" The plain-
tiff's immediate supervisor began harassing her sexually, referring to
her in vulgar terms and continually asking her to have sex with him.' 95
She promptly complained of this harassment to her supervisor's supe-
rior, but despite her complaints, the harassment persisted. 196 Instead
of remedying the problem, eventually the superior himself subjected
the plaintiff to sexual advances and harassment. 197 The plaintiff con-
ceded, however, that she never reported this conduct to anyone
higher up in the management chain. 198 The original supervisor's har-
assment reached its peak when he snuck up behind her and pulled
down her sweat pants in the plain view of other employees.'" She
immediately complained to the superior again, who agreed to write
an incident report." In an attempt to downplay the harassment,
however, he omitted the incident where the plaintiff's pants were
pulled down."'
The court found that once it became clear not only that the su-
perior was ineffective in dealing with the harassment, but also that he
himself was a sexual harasser, the plaintiff's failure to report either
harasser's behavior to a different supervisor was unreasonable.202 Fur-
thermore, the court held that the plaintiff's reliance on the superior's
admonitions not to "go over his head" did not excuse her failure to
disclose the harassment to a higher authority." The court found the
employer's sexual harassment policy and its implementation of the
policy "more than adequate," and did not consider that the most seri-
ous incident was intentionally omitted from the formal report in an
effort to downplay the harassment. 204
The only portion of the harassment for which the employer
could not assert the affirmative defense was the brief period that be-
gan with the plaintiff's first report to the superior and ended when he
himself began harassing her." The court affirmed the employer's
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motion for summary judgment regarding all other incidents of liar-
assment. 206
In 2001, in Saidu-Kamara v. Parkway Carp., the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted an employer's motion
for summary judgment in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that she
was subjected to various forms of discrimination and harassment
throughout her employment. 207 Her supervisor asked her out on dates
on several occasions, directed sexual innuendos towards her, and, on at
least one occasion, touched her breasts and buttocks, 208 The plaintiff
repeatedly reported these incidents to the facility manager, but no ac-
tion was taken. 209 The court stated that, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate sufficiently severe
or pervasive discrimination. 210 Therefore, the court concluded, the
plaintiff had not satisfied a necessary clement of her hostile work envi-
ronment claim and it granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment. 2 " In reaching its conclusion, the court did not address the
fact that the plaintiff had repeatedly reported these incidents and that
no action had been taken in response. 212
II. ANALYSIS OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT PRACTICES AND A PROPOSAL
FOR A MORE EQUITABLE AND CONSISTENT STANDARD
As the foregoing cases illustrate, the legal standard applied to
hostile work environment sexual 'harassment cases is inconsistent and
self-contradictory.2 " As demonstrated, the "severe or pervasive" stan-
46 Id.
"7 155 F. Stipp, 2d 436, 438 (E.I). Pa. 2001).
"8 Id.
2°3 Id.
210 Id. at 440.
211 Id.
212 See Sal du-Kamam, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 439-40.
213 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (stating that isolated
incidents, unless extremely severe, will not create an actionable environment); Alfano v.
Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate either
that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents was sufficiently
continuous and concerted); Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 269-70
(4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that she needed time to collect evidence
against her supervisor so company officials would believe her, and rejecting argument that
it was proper to refrain from reporting her supervisor so she could determine whether he
was a "predator" or merely an "interested man" who could be politely rebuffed); Phillips v.
Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033-34 (En Mo. 2000) (granting summary judg-
ment to employer where victim did not report incident that occurred three months prior
to the majority of the harassment, but did report promptly following the subsequent inci-
dents); Myra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
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dard is a very high threshold in many jurisdictions. 214 A plaintiff can
theoretically meet this threshold by showing one extremely severe in-
cident or a pattern of extensive, continuous, and long-lasting harass-
ment. 215 Because most plaintiffs fail to show that one incident was
sufficiently severe to satisfy the standard, they ordinarily must present
a case involving several incidents occurring within a concentrated pe-
riod of time. 216
A plaintiff who is able to establish a prima facie case must then
get past the obstacle of the employer's affirmative defense. 217 The
paradox, however, is that as the plaintiff's prima facie case grows
stronger, the probability that the employer will prevail on its
affirmative defense also increases. 218 Thus, by the time the harassment
becomes severe or pervasive, the plaintiff has likely waited too long to
complain.219 If the plaintiff was subjected to sufficiently severe or per-
vasive harassment, then the court looks to whether she filed formal
complaints following each incident. 220 If she has not, the employer
214 See supra notes 80-158 and accompanying text.
215 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Alfano, 294 F.3c1 at 374; Indest v. Freeman Decorating,
Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that actionable cases have involved patterns
or allegations of extensive, long-lasting, unredressed, and uninhibited sexual threats or
conduct that permeated the plaintiffs' work environment).
215 See, e.g., Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; Indest, 164 F.3d at 264; McGraw v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Labs., Inc., No, CIV. A. 96-5780, 1997 WL 799437, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1997) (stating
that courts have required plaintiff to show she has been subjected to continued explicit
propositions or sexual epithets or persistent offensive touchings).
20 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 792, 765
(1998).
215 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (stating that isolated incidents, unless extremely severe,
will not create an actionable environment); Conatzer v. Med. Proll Bldg. Servs. Corp., 95
F. App'x 276, 278 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding delay unreasonable where victim did not report
an isolated incident where supervisor leanerfup against her and rubbed against her side,
but did report the incident seventeen days later promptly following a second, more serious
incident); Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374 (stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate either that a
single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents was sufficiently con-
tinuous and concerted); Indest, 164 F.3d at 264 (stating that actionable cases have involved
patterns or allegations of extensive, long-lasting, unredressed, and uninhibited sexual
threats or conduct that permeated the plaintiffs' work environment); Phillips, 83 F. Stipp.
2d at 1033-34 (finding an unreasonable delay where victim did not report an isolated in-
cident that occurred three months prior to the majority of the harassment, but did report
promptly following the subsequent incidents).
215 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Alfano, 299 F.3d at 374; In-
dest, 164 F.3d at 264; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34.
220 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278 (finding delay unreasonable where victim did not
report initial incident, but did report promptly following a second incident); Wyatt v. Hunt
Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming partial summary judgment
for employer where plaintiff complained promptly of harassing supervisor's conduct to his
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will likely be able to assert the affirmative defense on the grounds that
the plaintiff failed to report the harassment promptly. 221 Essentially, a
victim of sexual harassment can be stripped of her ability to assert a
cause of action even before she has an actionable claim. 222
A. Lower Federal Courts Interpret the Same Conduct Differently When
Evaluating the Plaintiff's Prima Fade Case and the
Employer's Affirmative Defense
Many lower federal courts have set the "severe or pervasive"
threshold for establishing a hostile work environment far too high. 223
The Supreme Court stated that to meet the standard, the harassing
conduct must "create an objectively hostile or abusive work environ-
ment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive."224
 A reasonable person would likely feel sexually harassed in
some of the "nonactionable" cases set out above, many of which in-
volved lewd comments and physical touching of intimate body parts. 225
When analyzing a plaintiff's prima facie case, however, many courts
tend to downplay the severity of the harassment and the impact it
would have on a reasonable persoh . 226
Conversely, when analyzing the employer's affirmative defense,
courts characterize trivial harassment as significant, concluding that
superior, but then failed to complain when the superior himself began to harass her); Phil-
lips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1033-34.
4Y1 See Conalzen 95 F. App'x at 278; Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1033-34.
ra See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Gonatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at
1033-34.
225
 See supra notes 80-158 and accompanying text.
224
 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
225 See supra notes 80-117 and accompanying text.
226 See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Assoc., 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir.
1995) (stating that the actionable standard requires "conduct so egregious as to alter the
conditions of employment and destroy [women's] equal opportunity in the workplace");
Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428,430-31 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that. the con-
cept of sexual harassment is designed to protect women from the kind of behavior that can
make the workplace "hellish" for women, and concluding that "only a woman of Victorian
delicacy—a woman mysteriously aloof from contemporary American popular culture in all
its sex-saturated vulgarity"---would find the complained-of behavior distressing); Hosey v.
McDonald's Corp„ Civ. No. AW-95-196, 1990 WI, 414057, at *1-2 (D. Md. May 17, 1996)
(describing several unwelcome sexual advances, obscene comments, and approximately
ten incidents of offensive touching as "teenagers ... asking each other for dates"); supra
notes 80-117 and accompanying text. The court in DeAngelis reasoned that "a less onerous
standard of liability would attempt to insulate women from everyday insults as if they re-
mained models of Victorian reticence," and that "[a] lesser standard of liability would
mandate not equality but preference for women." 51 F.3d at 593,
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the plaintiff acted unreasonably by not taking the conduct more seri-
ously and filing a complaint with her employer.227 This not only makes
it more difficult for a plaintiff to establish severe or pervasive harass-
ment, but it also makes it more difficult to defeat the employer's
affirmative defense.228
Furthermore, this approach forces an employee who is subjected
to one isolated incident of trivial harassment to treat the incident as if
it were much more serious. 229 Although such an incident may be a
minor factor in the courts' prima facie case analysis, it could play a
decisive role in the affirmative defense analysis if a court finds that
this incident was the first episode in a pattern of harassment that the
plaintiff unreasonably failed to report promptly. 23° This is true even if
the incident was of negligible significance or was the only offensive
act to occur for months."'
Hence, when many courts look at a plaintiff's prima facie case
they ordinarily declare that incidents of harassment occurring weeks
apart were too isolated to be actionable. 232 These courts arc willing to
conclude that multiple incidents were merely "isolated," and there-
fore non-actionable, even when the conduct involved was reasonably
severe.2U When evaluating the employer's affirmative defense, how-
ever, the courts do not discuss isolated incidents or whether every in-
cident mentioned in the plaintiff's complaint should be part of the
227 See supra notes 160-191 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
229 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 160-
191 and accompanying text.
230 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 80-
117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
231 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 80-
117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
2" See, e.g., Schaber-Goa v. Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., No. 3:03CV7524, 2005 WL
1223891, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2005) (finding work environment non-actionable
where plaintiff's co-worker touched her crotch and grabbed her breast because the two
incidents were "situationally isolated" and, therefore, not "sufficiently pervasive"); Slough
v. Hawkins Mkt., Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862, 864 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (finding work envi-
ronment non-actionable where one co-worker patted the plaintiff on the buttocks and
grabbed her crotch, while another co-worker attempted to kiss her and apparently en-
gaged in self-stimulation while she was looking, because the court concluded these were
merely isolated incidents of offensive conduct); Crenshaw v. Delray Farms, Inc., 968 F.
Supp. 1300, 1301-03, 1306 (N.D. III. 1997) (finding work environment non-actionable
where plaintiff was harassed by at least six different co-workers and supervisors on at least
ten different occasions because these were merely isolated incidents that were not persis-
tent); supra notes 80-117 and accompanying text.
233 See, e.g., Schaber-Goa, 2005 WL 1223891, at *5; Blough, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 862, 864;
Crenshaw, 968 F. Supp. at 1301-03, 1306; supra notes 80-117 and accompanying text.
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same analysis. 234 Rather, in determining whether the plaintiff acted
reasonably, many courts look only at the interval between the first in-
cident mentioned in the complaint and the date she reported the
harassment. 235
This creates a substantial problem for a plaintiff who suffered
sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment, but was also subjected to a
trivial or isolated incident occurring much earlier. 236 Although the
initial incident would be too isolated to support a prima facie case,
courts routinely use this same incident to find that the plaintiff unrea-
sonably failed to report the harassment promptly and thereby allow
the employer to assert the affirmative defense. 237 These courts treat
the same incidents and the same time interval differently when ana-
lyzing the prima facie case and the affirmative defense. 238
 The usual
result of this practice is a grant of summary judgment for the em-
ployer. 239
If the plaintiff was harassed by multiple co-workers or supervisors,
courts ordinarily require that the victim report each succeeding inci-
dent of harassment and each succeeding harasser. 24° Employers arc
only required to respond to the incidents of harassment that are re-
ported.24 ' They are not required to end the harassment, either by the
234 See, e.g., Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1034; supra notes
160-191 and accompanying text.
235 See, e.g., Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281; Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1034; supra notes
160-191 and accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281; Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1034; supra notes 80-
117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
297 See, e.g., Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281; Srhaher-Goa, 2005 WL 1223891, at *5; Phillips,
83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1034; Blough, 51 F. Supp. 2(1 at 862, 864; Crenshaw, 968 F. Supp. at 1301—
03, 1306; supra notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
258 See, e.g., Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281; Schaber-Goa, 2005 WL 1223891, at *5; Phillips,
83 F. Stipp. al at 1034; Blough, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 862, 864; Crenshaw, 968 F. Supp. at 1301-
03, 1306; supra notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
239 See, e.g., Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281 (granting employer's motion for summary
judgment because plaintiff failed to report harassment promptly); Schalrer-Goa, 2005 WL
1223891, at *5 (granting employer's motion for summary judgment because incidents
were isolated); Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1034 (granting employer's motion for summary
judgment because plaintiff failed to report harassment promptly); Blough, 51 F. Stipp. 2d at
864 (granting employer's motion for sununary judgment because incidents were isolated);
Crenshaw, 968 F. Supp. at 1306 (same); supra notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying
text.
240 See Wyatt, 297 F.3d at 413; Blough, 51 F. Stipp. 2d at 862, 864; Crenshaw, 968 F. Supp.
at 1301-03, 1306; supra notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
241 See Crensharu, 968 F. Supp. at 1306.
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harasser who is reported or by subsequent harassers. 242 This low ex-
pectation for employers does a disservice to the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. u
Ellerth that employers must exercise "reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior."243
B. Plaintiffs Are Forced to Make an Early Prediction of Whether an Incident
of Harassment Is an Isolated Incident or the First in a Chain of Harassment
Although the Supreme Court stated that lower federal courts
should look to the cumulative effect of the harassment to judge its
severity and pervasiveness, it gave no guidance to victims as to what
types of conduct they must report to preserve a future cause of ac-
tion.2" The Court stated that hostile work environment claims are not
based on discrete acts, but rather on incidents that occur over a series
of days, months, or perhaps years.245 Although courts have the luxury
of viewing the whole record of harassment, victims cannot predict
what the cumulative effect of the harassment will be after only experi-
encing the first of what could develop into a series of incidents. 246
Furthermore, many sexual harassment victims do not possess the legal
expertise to know what types of harassment are serious enough to
warrant or require a formal complaint. 247
There is a general consensus among lower federal courts that
only extremely severe harassment creates a cause of action based on
one incident.248 Therefore, the majority of claims are based on the
accumulation of incidents. 249 Victims of harassment, however, are not
able to judge what the cumulative effect of the harassment will be. 25°
After being subjected to one incident of harassment, a victim must
decide how to react based on that single incident. 251 Presumably, if a
242 See Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Stipp. 369, 377 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (stating that
employers are only required to take remedial action "reasonably calculated to end the
harassment").
215 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerin, 524 U.S. at 765; supra notes 160-191 and ac-
companying text.
244 See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002).
245 Id.
246 See id.; supra notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
245 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; supra notes 80-158 and
accompanying text.
249 See, e.g., Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115; Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; lndest, 164 F.3d at 264; su-
pra notes 80-158 and accompanying text.
250 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115; supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
251 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
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woman knew that she would be harassed further or more severely in
the future, she would have a much stronger reaction to the single in-
cident.252 If, however, she knew that she would not be subjected to any
future incidents, she may be more inclined to ignore the isolated in-
ciden t. 253
Filing a formal complaint not only causes an inconvenience for
the victim, but it may create more aggravation than the offensive inci-
dent itself. 254 After complaining of sexual harassment, women have
been ostracized, threatened, and even terminated from their em-
ployment. 255 Aside from fear of possible retaliation, many other con-
cerns may influence a victim's decision not to report harassment. 256
Victims of sexual harassment are often young women who are being
harassed by older men or by direct supervisors who have authority
over them.257 They may be new employees or may simply have a gen-
eral hesitation to create tension or acrimony with co-workers and su-
pervisors, or they may be ashamed or embarrassed about the even t. 258
Some victims might feel uneasy with confrontational situations, mak-
ing it difficult to face the harasser or to complain about the con-
duct. 259 These concerns, among others, may simply outweigh the seri-
ousness of the initial conduct, leading a victim of harassment to
conclude that she would rather not file a formal complaint. 260 Faced
with the possibility of retaliation or ostracism by co-workers for report-
552 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115; supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
253 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 82, 98 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that
after reporting incident of sexual harassment, plaintiff was retaliated against and ostra-
cized by her co-workers); Hanna v. Boys & Girls Home & Family Servs., Inc., 212 F. Supp.
2d 1049, 1069 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (finding a factual issue whether plaintiff was terminated in
retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment); Pereira v. Schlage Elecs., 902 F. Supp.
1095, 1099, 1100-01 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing how after plaintiff complained of har-
assment, co-workers threatened to kill her, burn down her house, and kidnap her and
leave her where she would be raped and killed, as well as finding a factual issue whether
plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment).
"5
 See, e.g., Noviello, 398 F.3d at 82, 98; Hanna, 212 F. Stipp. 2d at 1069; Pereira, 902 F.
Supp. at 1099, 1100-01.
256
 See Noviello, 398 F.3d at 82, 98; Hanna, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; Pereira, 902 F. Supp.
at 1099, 1100-01.
257 See supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
2-" See supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
26D See supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
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ing harassment, it is no surprise that many victims choose to ignore
trivial or isolated incidents.261
As the standard is applied in many lower federal courts, however,
the victim must report the first incident or she will be barred from
asserting a cause of action in the future if the harassment continues
or escalates.262 Such a requirement is difficult to meet without the
benefit of being able to predict what will happen in the future. 263 For
example, in Conatzer v. Medical Professional Building Services Corp., the
Tenth Circuit barred the plaintiffs claim due to the employer's
affirmative defense. 264 The court found it unreasonable that the plain-
tiff did not report the first of two incidents, described as her supervi-
sor stepping up to her, leaning against her, and rubbing against the
side of her chest. 265 It hardly seems unreasonable that a woman would
choose not to report one such ambiguous occurrence, especially
when there was no indication at that time that any additional offenses
would occur.266 The court concluded that the reasonable and ex-
pected response to such an incident would be to file a formal sexual
harassment complaint with the employer. 267 Under the circumstances,
this may have been a fairly drastic response to what at the time
seemed an innocuous and ambiguous act. 268
The second incident occurred two weeks later. 269 When the plain-
tiff bent over to pick something up, her supervisor briefly placed her
in a headlock with his thighs.27° First, this incident was much more
offensive than the previous one, 271 For a woman's supervisor to place
her head between his legs is much more objectionable than his
merely rubbing against the side of her chest. 272 Second, this incident
was more significant because it was the second time in two weeks that
261 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 80-
212 and accompanying text.
262 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278 (finding delay unreasonable where victim did not
report an incident where supervisor leaned up against her and rubbed against her side);
Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at
281; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1034; supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
264 95 F. App'x at 281.
265 Id. at 278,281.
266 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281; supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
267 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281.
168 See id. at 278,281.
269 Id. at 278.
21° Id.
271 See id.
272 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278.
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her supervisor had physically touched her in an inappropriate man-
ner. 273 In light of the first incident, the victim was then able to evalu-
ate whether this was developing into a pattern of harassment rather
than a trivial and isolated incident. 274 Although the first incident may
have annoyed her, it was reasonably perceived as inconsequential
enough to ignore.275 It should at least have been reasonable for the
victim to decide that it did not mandate a formal complaint. 276 In con-
junction with the second incident, however, the initial conduct took
on greater significance. 277 The victim now could reasonably conclude
that the first incident was more than an isolated occurrence of annoy-
ing behavior.278 In fact, the victim in Conatzer appeared to reach this
conclusion because she reported both incidents promptly following
the second incident. 279
Sexual harassment victims as potential plaintiffs must benefit
from a view of the whole picture, as do the courts and employers. 28°
Considering the first incident described in Conatzer in isolation, it
would have been a bold, and likely fruitless, step for the victim to file
a complaint against her supervisor. 28 ' Once she realized, however, that
the supervisor's conduct would persist, she filed a complaint within
four or five days. 282 When the court in Conatzer was presented with the
facts of this case, it had the full record to evaluate. 283 To the court, the
plaintiff acted unreasonably because she failed to report the first inci-
dent after it happened. 284 This was, of course, with the knowledge that
the second incident would later occur. 285
This analysis forces an employee to file a formal complaint every
time any ambiguous conduct occurs. 286 Thus, it contradicts the Su-





277 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278.
278 See id,
279 See id.
28° See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115; Alfano, 294 F.3(1 at 374; Indest, 164 F.3d at 264; supra
notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
281 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278.
282 See id.
283 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115; Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; supra 'Ivies 168-174 and
accompanying text.
284 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281.
285 See id.
2" See id. at 278, 281; supra notes 80-117, 160-191 and accompanying text.
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civility code for the workplace. 287 Although it seems reasonable not to
file a sexual harassment complaint for insignificant occurrences,
many courts evaluating the affirmative defense find that such inci-
dents do constitute acts of sexual harassment, at least when followed
by further incidents in the future. 288
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in
Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., engaged in a similar analysis, although in this
case the initial incident was more serious than in Conatzer. 289 In Phillips,
the first incident occurred when the supervisor squeezed the plaintiff's
breasts.2" Three months later, and within a seven-day period, he sub-
jected her to four more incidents of harassment. 28' Two days after the
fourth incident, the plaintiff reported the conduct to her employer. 292
Although the initial incident was serious, the victim had no reason to
suspect that the conduct would be repeated. 293 She may have had a
multitude of reasons for deciding not to file a formal complaint in re-
sponse.294 For three months, it would have appeared that the first inci-
dent was nothing more than an isolated occurrence. 293
Then, three months later, the harassment resurfaced when the
supervisor subjected the victim to four incidents of harassment in a
seven-day period.298 She reported the conduct to her employer two
days after the last incident.297 The court looked at the date of the ini-
tial incident and the date the plaintiff made the report and con-
cluded that a delay of over three months was unreasonable. 298 In mak-
ing this calculation, the court presupposed that the initial incident
and the four incidents occurring three months later were all part of
the same pattern of harassment. 299 What if the first incident had oc-
curred one year earlier? Or five years?
287 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
258 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 80—
117,160-191 and accompanying text.
2B9 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033; supra notes 160-174
and accompanying text.




2" See, e.g., Noviello, 398 F.3d at 82, 98; Hanna, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; Pereira, 902 F.
Supp. at 1099, 1100-01; supra notes 160-167 and accompanying text.
295 See Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 See id. at 1034.
2'39 See id. at 1033-34.
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C. Although Courts Are Unduly Strict When Dealing with Plaintiffs,
They Show Leniency to Employers
Lower federal courts hold sexual harassment victims and em-
ployers to different standards of "reasonableness."" When analyzing
the affirmative defense, courts hold plaintiffs to a strict standard of
reasonable conduct while allowing employers to engage in quite un-
reasonable practices."' In fact, many courts imply that the plaintiff
has the burden to refute a presumption in favor of the employer
when evaluating the employer's affirmative defense."2
In Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., the court effectively found the plain-
tiff at fault for the employer's unsatisfactory response." After the
plaintiff's immediate supervisor began harassing her, she promptly
complained to the supervisor's superior, but despite her complaints,
the harassment persisted." Instead of remedying the problem, the
superior himself eventually subjected the plaintiff to sexual advances
and harassment." The court found that the plaintiff's failure to re-
port either harasser's behavior to an additional supervisor was unrea-
sonable." Even though the plaintiff reported the first supervisor's
conduct to an appropriate person within the company, the court
found that she needed to report it again because the person to whom
she complained was ineffective in remedying the problem. 307 The
court concluded that any harassment occurring after the victim real-
ized the superior was ineffective in dealing with the complaint could
not survive a motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff had
500 See supra notes 80-117, 160-212 and accompanying text.
tot See supra notes 160-212 and accompanying text.
502 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Eller* 524 U.S. at 765 (stating that the exis-
tence of an anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure is not necessary in every
instance as a matter of law, and proof that an employee failed to use any complaint proce-
dure provided by the employer will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden to
show that an employee failed to fulfill the. obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm);
Wyatt, 297 F.3d at 407-08, 413 (finding that once it became clear that the supervisor was
ineffective in dealing with the harassment, the plaintiff's failure to report the harassment
to a different supervisor was unreasonable); supra notes 160-212 and accompanying text.
The Wyatt court also found that the employer's sexual harassment policy and its imple-
mentation were more than adequate, even though the plaintiff had to report the harass-
ment multiple times, was sexually harassed by the supervisor to whom she complained,
and the employer intentionally omitted the most serious incident to downplay the harass-
ment when a formal report was finally completed. 297 F.3d at 407-08, 413.
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acted unreasonably.308 Instead of holding the employer liable for cre-
ating an ineffective complaint procedure, the court found that the
victim had a responsibility to keep reporting the harassment until she
could find someone who would take her complaint seriously.B® Al-
though the victim promptly reported the harassment, only to be sexu-
ally harassed by the person to whom she had complained, the court
found that she had acted unreasonably, not the employer.310
Conversely, courts hold employers to a low standard of reason-
ableness, even when they act quite unreasonab1y. 5" In Saidu-Kamara u
Parkway Corp., the plaintiff experienced various forms of harassment
throughout her employmen0 12 Although she repeatedly reported
these incidents, her employer took no action in response. 3" The
court stated that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate sufficiently
severe or pervasive harassment, and granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment. 514 In a case such as this, a victim could only
force the employer to act if the harassment finally became severe or
pervasive. 315 Only then would the court potentially grant relief. 316
Otherwise, she must either accept the harassment and the fact that
her employer has no duty to end it, or quit her job. 317 Allowing em-
ployers to ignore reports of harassment like this sets a troubling
precedent.318 The courts are conveying the message that employers
have no obligation to respond to complaints of harassment unless the
harassment is of the magnitude found in the actionable cases set out
above—that is, a high level of severity or pervasiveness, and, in some
308 Wyatt, 297 F.3d at 413.
509 See id.
310 See id.
311 See Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 938; supra notes 193-212 and accompanying
text.
312 155 F. Stipp. 2d at 438.
318 Id.
3 " Id. at 440.
313 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F, Stipp. 2d at 440; supra notes 80-
212 and accompanying text.
318 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 440; supra notes 80-
212 and accompanying text.
317 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 440; supra notes 80-
212 and accompanying text.
318 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 440; supra notes 193-
212 and accompanying text.
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cases, more abusive than physical groping of intimate body parts and
sexual assaults. 516
Admittedly, it is not desirable to have courts require employers to
respond to complaints of truly trivial harassment or, in the words of
the Supreme Court, "the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such
as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and oc-
casional teasing."32° It should be just as undesirable to require victims
to report these incidents. 321 If employers are only required to respond
to actionable harassment, employees should be held to the same
standard. 322 An employee must report every instance of harassment to
preserve a cause of action, while the employer need not respond. 323
The legal obligations of employees and employers should be placed
on equal footing. 324 If an employer is only required to respond to an
actionable environment, then an employee should only be required
to report actionable harassment. 325
D. Leveling the Field: Placing Equal Obligations on Employees and Employers
Courts should require hostile work environment victims to report
sexual harassment only once it becomes severe or pervasive. 326 This
319 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; McPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430,439 (7th
Cir. 2004); Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.3d 500,511 (7th Cir. 1999); Saidu-Kamara, 155
F. Supp. 2d at 440; supra notes 80-212 and accompanying text.
320 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (quoting BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID KADUE, SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992)); supra notes 55-212 and accompany-
ing text.
321 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
322 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281 (finding that the harass-
ment was comprised of isolated incidents and, therefore, was non-actionable, but also
finding that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to report the conduct); Slay v. Glickman, 137
E Supp. 2d 743, 751-52 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (finding that plaintiff unreasonably failed to
report the harassment, but also finding that a reasonable person would not conclude that
the complained-of harassment would constitute a hostile work environment); supra notes
55-212 and accompanying text.
323 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Supp.
2d at 438, 440; Slay, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52; supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
324 See Famgher, 524 U.S. at 807; Conatzei; 95 F. App'x at 281; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Stapp.
2d at 438, 440; Slay, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52; supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
325 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 281; Saidu-Kamara, 155 F. Stipp.
2d at 438, 440; Slay, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52; supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
323 See Famgher; 524 U.S. at 807-08 (stating that demonstration that the plaintiff unrea-
sonably failed to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer's burden, but that an employer will be subject to vicarious
liability for an "actionable" hostile environment); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (stating that
demonstration that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use any complaint procedure pro-
vided by the employer will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden); Madray v.
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rule serves three purposes. 327 First, the victim is not required to report
harassment if it is not truly serious enough to upset her. 328 She would
only need to file a report when a severe incident occurs or minor in-
cidents go on so long as to become sufficiently pervasive. 329 Second,
this standard would be truer to the requirements of the affirmative
defense. 33° The employer would still avoid liability if it took appropri-
ate action to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing be-
havior of which it was aware. 331 Under this proposed standard, the
employer could better judge the necessity for a response because the
reported behavior would be more serious. 332 The employer would still
only be required to act once it had notice of the harassment. 333 Third,
this standard would place the plaintiff's prima facie case and the em-
ployer's affirmative defense on equal footing. 334 Under this approach,
the plaintiff would have an actionable claim, and the employer would
have an affirmative defense. 338
Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290,1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that, once an em-
ployer has promulgated an effective anti-harassment policy, it is then incumbent upon the
employees to utilize the procedural mechanisms established); supra notes 55-212 and ac-
companying text.
327 See infra notes 328-335 and accompanying text.
323 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Mad ray, 208 F.3d at 1300;
supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
n9 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Allan°, 294 F.3d at 374 (stat-
ing that a plaintiff must demonstrate either that a single incident was extraordinarily se-
vere, or that a series of incidents was sufficiently continuous and concerted); Madray, 208
F.3d at 1300; Indent, 164 F.3d at 264 (stating that actionable cases have involved patterns or
allegations of extensive, long-lasting, unredressed, and uninhibited sexual threats or con-
duct that permeated the plaintiffs' work environment); supra notes 55-212 and accompa-
nying text.
35° See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (concluding that to assert its affirmative defense an
employer must prove that (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct
any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
otherwise avoid harm); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
331 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; supra notes 55-212 and accom-
panying text.
352 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08 (stating that an employer will be subject to vicarious
liability for an "actionable" hostile work environment); Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; Indent, 164
F.3d at 264; supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
333 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300;
supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
551 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Alfano, 294 F.3(1 at 374; In-
de,st, 164 F.3d at 264; Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 55-212 and accompa-
nying text.
555 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; In-
dest, 164 F.3d at 264; Phillips, 83 F. Stipp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 55-212 and accompa-
nying text.
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This standard is much more consistent than the current system.336
Presently, the courts are faced with plaintiffs who cannot present a
prima facie case and also who cannot defeat the employer's affirmative
defense. 537
 An employer is not legally required to do anything until the
harassment becomes actionable. 338
 If an employer is only required to
respond to actionable harassment, then an employee should only be
required to report actionable harassment. 339
This proposed standard would also make the courts' analysis of a
plaintiff's prima facie case and the employer's affirmative defense
more consistent with each other. 3" Under the present standards,
many courts conclude that a plaintiff suffered only isolated or trivial
harassment—that is, non-actionable—while also concluding that the
plaintiff was unreasonable for failing to report 4.34 ' When evaluating
the plaintiffs prima facie case, such courts find that the harassment
was insignificant, some even opining that the victim was overly sensi-
tive for perceiving such conduct as offensive. 342
 When evaluating the
affirmative defense, however, the same incident of harassment could
be the decisive factor in absolving the employer of liability because
the court may conclude that any reasonable person would have
promptly reported the incident. 343
 Under the proposed standard, the
courts' reasoning would be more consistent and equitable. 344 if the
court finds that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
be actionable, then it could logically conclude that the plaintiff was
3" See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Canatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374; hi-
des', 164 F.3d at 264; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 55-212 and accompa-
nying text.
"7 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; gonatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278; Allan°, 294 F.3d at
374; Indest, 164 F.3d at 264; Phillips, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34; supra notes 80-117,160-191
and accompanying text.
353 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; supra notes 193-212 and accompanying text
359
 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
349 See Conatzer, 95 F. App'x at 278 (finding that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to re-
port harassment even though it was no more than isolated incidents, and therefore, non-
actionable); DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 593; Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430-31; Slay, 137 F. Supp. 2d at
751-52 (finding that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to report the harassment while also
finding that a reasonable person would not consider the complained-of harassment to
constitute a hostile work environment); Phillips, 83 E Supp. 2d at 1033-34; Nosey, 1996 WI..
414057, at *1-2; supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
541 See supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
342
 See DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 593; Baskeroille, 50 F.3d at 430-31; supra notes 80-117 and
accompanying text.
543 See supra notes 160-191 arid accompanying text.
344 See supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
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unreasonable in failing to report it. 345 If the harassment was not se-
vere or pervasive, however, then it is irrational to require the victim to
report what is non-actionable. 346 Under the proposed standard, plain-
tiffs and employers are treated equally. 347
Although victims of sexual harassment should be encouraged to
report any incidents that they deem serious or that could lead to more
severe incidents, they should only have a legal obligation to report ac-
tionable, and thus "severe or pervasive," harassments" It is inappropri-
ate to require victims to report every trivial incident of annoying behav-
ior simply to ensure they can retain a cause of action in the future. 343
This inconsistent legal standard is unduly burdensome for victims of
sexual harassments" It is not good for workplace morale or workplace
relations. 351 And it creates additional administrative costs for employers
because they must investigate complaints that employees may not oth-
erwise have chosen to file unless required to do so. 352 Therefore, lower
federal courts should abandon the current standards for hostile work
environment sexual harassment cases in favor of an approach that is
more consistent, logical, and evenhanded. 353
CONCLUSION
Hostile work environment sexual harassment has become a re-
current probleni in this country. The standards developed by the U.S.
Supreme Court for handling this issue have been ineffective because,
for the most part, these standards unduly favor employers over vic-
tims. The leniency that lower federal courts show towards employers
has led them to engage in liability-avoidance techniques rather than
harassment-prevention practices. Conversely, the strict standards to
which plaintiff-employees are held make it extremely difficult to es-
tablish a prima facie case. Even if a plaintiff establishes an actionable
claim, she may still find it challenging to prevail because many courts
effectively require a plaintiff to refute a presumption in favor of the
employer on the employer's own affirmative defense.
395 See supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
31(1
	 supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 80-117,160-191 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
349 See supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
35° See supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
351 See supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
352 See supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 55-212 and accompanying text.
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First, lower federal courts require an unreasonably high level of
severity or pervasiveness to establish an actionable claim. Federal
courts have essentially required that the conduct either be extremely
severe or he extensive, continuous, and long-lasting. Second, courts
give plaintiffs a narrow window in which to report harassment. With-
out regard to the many reasons victims of sexual harassment may wish
not to report isolated or trivial conduct, courts have found it unrea-
sonable for victims to delay even a few weeks before filing a formal
report with the employer. Third, even in cases where harassment is
promptly reported, courts show leniency to employers in evaluating
the reasonableness of their response. If the complained-of harassment
was not severe or pervasive, the courts do not require an employer to
make any response at all, and in cases where the harassment was ac-
tionable, employers are not required to end the harassment. These
practices have tipped the scales heavily in favor of employers.
Given the disparity in resources available to most employers in
comparison to employees, it is unfair to give them an additional ad-
vantage in court. It is unreasonable to expect a victim of sexual har-
assment to know which types of conduct are actionable and which are
not. Likewise, it is unlikely that a victim is aware that if she waits more
than a couple of weeks to report an incident, she will lose her cause of
action, if she ever had one. Because victims are usually unaware of the
legal standards, courts should show them leniency, rather than show-
ing it to employers that commonly deal with the legal issues surround-
ing sexual harassment.
If victims of sexual harassment were only required to report ac-
tionable conduct, it would be more reasonable to hold them account-
able for failing to bring it to the employer's attention. It is under-
standable that victims are more likely to report serious incidents than
trivial ones. Furthermore, only requiring victims to report actionable
harassment places their legal claims on the same footing as the em-
ployer's affirmative defense. The plaintiff will win or lose on her
prima fade case based on whether the harassment was sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive. The employer will win or lose on its affirmative de-
fense based on whether the victim reported the harassment and the
reasonableness of the employer's response. This is more consistent
than the current standard, under which courts may find that the
plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case and also failed to get
past the employer's affirmative defense by failing to report what was
not actionable.
A standard that provides that sexual harassment must either be
extremely severe or continue long enough to be pervasive, but then
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also provides that a victim must promptly report the conduct follow-
ing the first incident—whether actionable or not—is contradictory.
Under the proposed standard, by contrast, the victim must report the
conduct only if (1) the conduct is extremely severe and therefore ac-
tionable, or (2) the conduct continues long enough to be pervasive
and is therefore actionable. This standard is both more consistent
with the principles behind the hostile work environment cause of ac-
tion and more equitable.
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